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Abstract
A notion of an image structure associated with the canonical epistemic state is introduced.
Based on it, we get a representation result for recovering contraction inference relations satis-
fying the condition weak conjunctive inclusion (wci) in terms of F-standard epistemic AGM
states. In e6ect, this result establishes a representation theorem for belief contraction functions
satisfying AGM postulates (k-1) – (k-7), and Rott’s (wci) and (k-8c), and hence generalizes
Rott’s corresponding result in the :nite framework. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
Belief change is one of important researching topics in knowledge representation and
reasoning. In certain sense, approaches suggested in this :eld can be broadly classi:ed
into two categories: coherentist and foundationalist approaches to belief change. In the
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former category, the best known is AGM theory which is a milestone in this :eld
(see [1]). In the latter category, Nebel, Fuhrmann and Hansson may be representative
persons who suggest studying changes of base-generated belief sets (see [8,10,14]).
Coherentist approach takes deductively closed sets of propositions as belief states,
and does not account for the fact that some of agent’s beliefs may be reasons for other
beliefs [2]. Contrastively, foundationalist approach regards the corpus of beliefs as gen-
erated by some set of basic propositions, and changes of these base-generated belief sets
are determined by changes in their underlying base [2]. A more comprehensive com-
parison between coherentist and foundationalist approaches may be found in [11,17].
A common mechanism of the AGM and base-generation representation is a selection
mechanism on certain sets of propositions. For AGM paradigm, the selection mecha-
nism is set over maximal deductively closed subsets of the belief set, while for the
base-generation representation, it is set over the sub-theories of the belief set that are
generated by subsets of the base. In the literature, the selection mechanism is depicted
in two di6erent manners: choice function and preferential relation, and the former is
more general than the latter from the mathematical point of view.
Recently, a general notion of an epistemic state, which subsumes both the AGM
and base-generation paradigm, is introduced and studied by Bochman in [2,3,4,5,6]. In
accordance with the opinion that 1 “a rational choice should be a relational choice”,
in Bochman’s framework, the selection mechanism is characterized by a structure con-
sisting of some sub-theories of the belief set, ordered by a preferential relation. So, the
essential and common feature of AGM and base-generation representation is explicitly
embodied in the notion of the epistemic state. In this sense, the notion of the epis-
temic state may be regarded as a generalization of common representations suggested
for belief change.
However, in order to present a theory of belief change, it needs not only to provide
an appropriate framework to represent agent’s belief state but also to describe change
operations based on this framework. For the moment, the operation of contraction
over epistemic states has been studied in [2,3,5,6], however, for two other operations
(i.e., expansion and revision) over epistemic states, just some initial steps are made in
[2,4,5]. “It turns out that the task of describing corresponding operations on epistemic
states is far from being trivial or unequivocal” [6]. It is worth stressing that, the
shift in the level of representation results in some drastic changes in the character of
the corresponding operations, in particular, Bochman’s classi:cation of operations on
epistemic states does not correspond exactly to the distinction between contractions and
expansions of belief sets. 2 However, both AGM theory and the theory of base change
can be reconstructed in Bochman’s framework by de:ning appropriate operations on
the associated epistemic states (see [5]), 3 in this sense, we think that, Bochman’s
framework provides a general theory of belief change. Of course, as pointed out by
Bochman himself, further work is needed (see [6]).
1 Rott also holds the similar opinion, see [16].
2 Quoted from [5, p. 335]
3 In fact, some alternative approaches, such as Levi’s coherentist theory or Fagin’s Oock-generated change,
also can be naturally represented in Bochman’s framework (see [6]).
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It is well known that there exist intimate connections between belief change and
nonmonotonic reasoning, the following slogan due to GPardenfors and Makinson reOects
this viewpoint (see [9,13]):
“Belief change and nonmonotonic inference are actually two sides of the same coin.”
In AGM paradigm, both contraction and revision operations on belief sets can cor-
respond to nonmonotonic inferences with rules of the form “If , then normally ”
(see [9]). In Bochman’s framework, similar work has been done also. Guided by
the above slogan, Bochman introduces a new kind of nonmonotonic inference rela-
tion so-called contraction relation with contraction rules of the form “If  is not be-
lieved, then normally ”, and shows that contraction relations correspond to contraction
operations on epistemic states (see [3]). However, according to the intended meanings
of contraction rules, it seems that, unlike the connection between the nonmonotonic
inference and the traditional AGM theory, there is no natural and direct connection be-
tween contraction relations and revision operations on epistemic states. In other words,
contraction relations can serve as counterparts to contraction operations on epistemic
states, but not to revision operations. Fortunately, Bochman has shown that, another
kind of inference relations called skeptical inference relations can directly correspond
to revision operations on epistemic states, technical details may be found in [5].
In this paper, we concern ourselves with contraction relations. Bochman studies
contraction relations and related postulates systematically, and provides semantic char-
acterizations for various relations including AGM contraction and contractions that do
not satisfy the postulate Recovery (see [3]). However, his results leave open questions
of representation theorems for some contraction relations. This paper will deal with an
important representation theorem for a special kind of contraction relations, in e6ect,
our main result generalizes the one obtained by Hans Rott in [16]. Since the further
explanation for the aim of this paper depends on some antecedent knowledge in this
:eld, we leave it for the next section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we recall some basic
de:nitions and results related to this paper. A notion of an image structure is intro-
duced in Section 3. In Section 4, we establish a representation theorem for a special
kind of contraction relations in terms of F-standard epistemic AGM states. Finally, in
Section 5, we compare our work with related ones appeared in the literature.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we will recall some basic de:nitions and postulates from [3], which
will be used in this paper. The motivations behind these de:nitions and postulates may
be found in [3].
2.1. Contraction inference relations
We consider formulae of classical propositional calculus built over a set of atomic
formulae denoted L plus two constants t and f (the formulae true and false
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respectively). We denote the set of all well formed formulae by Form(L). As usual,
|= means that  is a tautology, |= is the classical entailment relation, maximal con-
sistent sets of formulae are called worlds, and sets of propositions closed with respect
to |= are called deductively closed. We use lower case letters of the Greek alphabet
to denote formulae, and the letters v, v1, v2; : : : n; m; : : : to denote worlds.
A contraction inference relation has rules of the form  which are called con-
traction rules. The intended meaning of such rules is ‘ should be believed in the
absence of ’ or ‘If  is not believed then normally ’. Formally, a contraction infer-
ence relation is a binary relation over the set Form(L) which satis:es the following
postulates:
(C1) Tautology:  t
(C2) And: If  and  then ∧
(C3) Right Weakening: If  |= and  then 
(C4) Extensionality: If |=↔ and  then 
(CF) Failure: If  then  if and only if f
(C5) Partial Antitony: If ∧ then ∧∧
(C6) Cautious Antitony: If ∧ and  then ∧
(C7) Distributivity: If  and  then ∧
(C8) Cautious Monotony: If ∧∧ then 
It turns out that preferential consequence relations introduced in [12] can be seen
as a special case of contraction relations. More precisely, the former can be identi:ed
with a special kind of the latter satisfying the rule ¬, for any proposition  (see
[3]).
In addition to the above postulates, some other interesting postulates are introduced
in [3], among them, the following postulates are concerned in this paper.
(CI) Inclusion: If , then f.
(CV) Vacuity: If f   and f, then .
(CR) Recovery: If f, then → :
A contraction relation will be called coherent if it satis:es Inclusion and Vacuity. A
contraction relation will be called recovering contraction if it is coherent and satis:es
Recovery.
Given a contraction relation  , in the following, we will denote the set { : }
by T. A proposition  will be said to be known with respect to  , if  holds;
otherwise, it will be called contingent. The set of all propositions that are known with
respect to  will be called the knowledge set and denoted by K. A proposition 
will be said to be believed with respect to  , if f holds. We will denote the set
{ :f} by B and call it belief set.
Lemma 2.1 (Bochman [3]). Given a contraction relation  , we have
(i) If ∧↔ then T= T.
(ii) If ∧→  and ∧→  then → .
The connections between the above postulates and the ones for belief contraction
function appeared in the literature may be found in [3]. Here, for a future refer-
ence, we list AGM postulates for contraction function presented in [1] as follows:
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(k-1)Cn(K÷)=K÷ (closure)
(k-2)K÷⊆K (inclusion)
(k-3) If  =∈K , then K÷=K (vacuity)
(k-4) If  =∈Cn(∅), then  =∈K÷ (success)
(k-5) If Cn()=Cn(), then K÷=K÷ (extensionality)
(k-6)K⊆Cn((K÷)∪{}) (recovery)
(k-7) (K÷)∩(K÷)⊆K÷(∧) (conjunction1)
(k-8) If  =∈K÷(∧), then K÷(∧)⊆K÷ (conjunction2)
2.2. Epistemic states
An epistemic state E in a language L is a triple (B; l;≺), where B is a set of objects
called admissible belief states, l is a function assigning a deductively closed theory in
L to every state from B, and ≺ is a strict partial order and called preferential relation
on B. Clearly, the notion of the epistemic state is very similar to the preferential or
cumulative model de:ned in [12].
Following Bochman, if s≺ t, we will say that the state t is preferred to the state s.
Notice that this notation reverses the direction of preference as compared with common
representations in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning.
Given an epistemic state E=(B; l;≺), for any A⊆B, we will use max(A) to denote
the set of all maximal elements of A with respect to ≺ , i.e., max(A)= {s : s∈A and
¬∃t(t∈A and s≺ t)}. For a proposition , we will denote the set of all admissible
belief states from E that do not satisfy  by ][E , i.e., ][E = {s : s∈B and  =∈l(s)}.
We will omit the subscript in ][E when there is no ambiguity. The range of l will be
denoted by rang(l), i.e., rang(l)= {v :∃s(s∈B and l(s)= v)}; For any X ⊆B, the set
{v :∃s(s∈X and l(s)= v)} will be denoted by l(X ).
A proposition will be said to be known in E if it holds in all admissible belief states
from E; otherwise, it will be called contingent in E. A proposition will be said to be
believed in E if it holds in all maximally preferred admissible belief states from E.
The set of all propositions believed in E will be called a belief set of E and will be
denoted by BE .
Various conditions imposed on epistemic states may give rise to notions of special
epistemic states. In the following, we recall some notions concerned in this paper.
Denition 2.1. An epistemic state will be called standard if the labeling function is
injective, that is, no two admissible belief states are labeled with the same deductively
closed theory.
Clearly, for standard epistemic states, admissible belief states can be identi:ed with
their associated theories. So, a standard epistemic state can be alternately described
as a pair (T;≺), where T is a set of deductively closed theories and ≺ a preference
relation on T:
Denition 2.2. An epistemic state E will be called coherent if it contains an admissible
belief state k such that, for any other admissible state t; t≺k and l(t)⊆l(k).
550 Z. Zhu et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 545–564
Let K be a deductively closed theory. A theory u⊆K will be called K-maximal if
it is a maximal proper subtheory of K . The set of all K-maximal theories, coupled
with K itself, will be denoted by K⊥.
Denition 2.3. A coherent epistemic state E with a belief set K will be called an
epistemic AGM state if l(s)∈K⊥ for any admissible belief state s from E.
Denition 2.4. An epistemic state will be called (negatively) smooth if, for any con-
tingent proposition  and s∈][, either s is maximal preferred in ][, or there exists a
more preferred state t that is maximal preferred in ][.
Denition 2.5. A contraction rule  will be said to be valid with respect to an
epistemic state E if either  is contingent in E and  holds in all preferred states from
][, or  is known in E and  is believed in E. The set of contraction rules that are
valid in E will be denoted by E .
Bochman establishes a number of representation theorems in terms of epistemic states
for various contraction relations in [3]. Among them, he obtains the following theorem
(representation theorem for recovering contraction inferences):
A contraction relation  is recovering if and only if there exists an epistemic AGM
state E such that  coincides with E .
As Bochman has pointed out, the above representation result refers to arbitrary epis-
temic AGM states, not only to standard ones. In [16], Rott has showed that, for rela-
tional AGM contractions, in order to have a representation in terms of standard AGM
states we need to add some further conditions, Rott gives a suUcient condition called
weak conjunctive inclusion (wci) 4 as follows, where K is a belief set, ÷ is a contrac-
tion operator over K :
(wci) K ÷ ( ∧ ) ⊆ Cn(K ÷  ∪ K ÷ )
For contraction relations, the above condition wci may be represented as follows:
(wci)  ∧  ⊆ Cn( T ∪ T); where  and  are contingent propositions:
In the :nite framework, the condition wci turns out to be also a necessary condition
for a representation in terms of standard AGM states. For the moment, we do not know
whether it is necessary in the in:nite case. Anyway, just as pointed by Bochman, it
seems to be a diUcult task to exactly characterize contraction relations which admit of
a representation in terms of standard epistemic AGM states.
This paper will introduce a notion of an F-standard epistemic AGM state, which
is similar to the standard model introduced by Freund in [7], and establish a repre-
sentation theorem for recovering contraction relations satisfying the condition wci in
terms of F-standard epistemic AGM states. Since recovering contraction relations can
be characterized as contraction relations satisfying the basic AGM postulates (k-1)–
4 In [16], the postulate wci is called k-8r. This paper follows Hansson (see [11]), and calls it weak
conjunctive inclusion.
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(k-6) and the supplementary postulate (k-7) and Rott’s (k-8c) 5 (see [3]), our result
generalizes the one obtained in [16], where, in the :nite case, Rott establishes a repre-
sentation theorem for contraction functions satisfying postulates (k-1)–(k-7), (wci) and
(k-8c) in terms of negatively transitively relational partial meet contraction functions
(see Corollary 2 in [16]).
2.3. Canonical epistemic states
In this subsection, we will outline the construction of canonical epistemic state pre-
sented by Bochman, which plays a central role in establishing representation theorems
for contraction relations in [3]. It will be easy to see that, the canonical epistemic state
coincides, in e6ect, with the corresponding construction introduced by Kraus et al. in
[12], however, the de:nitions in Bochman’s framework are rather di6erent from the
ones in [12].
Denition 2.6. Given a contraction relation  , for any formulas  and , 6 if and
only if ∧→ .
Denition 2.7. Given a contraction relation  , a deductively closed theory u will be
called normal for a contingent proposition  if  =∈u and, for any  such that 6,
either ∈u or T⊆u. A deductively closed theory u will be called rec-normal for a
contingent proposition  if u coincides with v∩B, where v is a normal world for
. For any deductively closed theory u, we will denote the set { : u is normal (or,
rec-normal) for } by "u (respectively, " recu ).
The following lemma lists some properties obtained in [3], which will be used in
this paper.
Lemma 2.2. If  is a contraction relation, then
(i) If 6 and 6 then 6∧.
(ii) A world u is normal for  if and only if it includes both ¬ and T.
(iii) If 6, u is a normal theory for  and  =∈u, then u is normal for .
In order to establish representation theorem for contraction relations, Bochman in-
troduces the notion of the canonical epistemic state. Given a contraction relation  ,
the canonical epistemic state (Bc; lc;≺c) for  is de:ned as follows:
(i) Bc={(u; ) :  is contingent and u is normal for };
(ii) (u; )≺c (v; ) if and only if 6 and ∈v; and
(iii) lc((u; ))= u.
Based on the above construction, Bochman obtains the following result in [3]:
5 (k-8c) If ∈K÷ (∧), then K÷ (∧)⊆K÷.
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Theorem 2.1. Let  be a contraction relation. If Ec = (Bc; lc;≺c) is the canonical
epistemic state for  , then
(i) ≺c is a strict partial order,
(ii) ][ is smooth, for any contingent proposition , and
(iii) =Ec .
As observed by Bochman, when dealing with the representation theorem for recov-
ering contraction inferences, we can restrict our attention to rec-normal theories. In
other words, for recovering contractions, the set Bc may be rede:ned as follows:
(i′) Bc = {(u; ) :  is contingent and u is rec-normal for }:
In the following, such canonical epistemic states will be called canonical epistemic
states for recovering contractions (canonical rec-epistemic state, for short). Here, the
following two remarks should be noted.
First, since epistemic AGM states are coherent, any epistemic AGM state should
contain an admissible belief state k such that, for any other admissible state t, t≺k
and l(t)⊆l(k). However, if a recovering contraction relation  satis:es ff, then
the set Bc is empty, 6 so, its canonical epistemic state is not coherent at all. Hence,
strictly speaking, the canonical rec-epistemic state is applicable just for the recovering
contraction inference such that f f, and we must deal with the limited case in another
manner. 7 In the next section, we will consider these two di6erent cases.
Second, even if a recovering contraction  satis:es f f, the canonical rec-epistemic
state for  is just ‘almost’ coherent in that all its preferred states are labeled by B,
and we will get a required epistemic AGM state by identifying all these states (see
[3]).
For exploring the properties of the image structure induced by the canonical rec-
epistemic state (de:ned in the next section), the following lemma is useful, which
lists some properties of the canonical rec-epistemic state. Although many of them are
implied in [3], for integrality, we give proofs of them here.
Lemma 2.3. Let  be a recovering contraction relation. If Ec = (Bc; lc;≺c) is the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  , then
(i) If 6, u is rec-normal for  and  =∈u, then u is rec-normal for :
(ii) If 6; 6, u is rec-normal for  and ∈u, then ∈u:
(iii) The relation ≺c is a strict partial order.
(iv) Let ∈B and u be rec-normal for . If (u; ) is maximal in ][ then 6:
(v) Let u be rec-normal for . If  =∈u and 6, then (u; ) is maximal in ][:
(vi) If  =∈B and u is rec-normal for , then (u; ) is a preferred state in Bc.
(vii) For any contingent proposition , the set ][ is smooth.
6 By Right Weakening, Extensionality and ff, we get ∧f∧f for any  and . Further, by
Cautious Monotony,  holds, in particular, we have . So, for any formula ,  is not contingent.
7 When dealing with the representation theorem for the contraction relation in terms of the epistemic state
(i.e., Representation Theorem 1 in [3]), since the triple 〈∅; ∅; ∅〉 is an epistemic state trivially, it is not
needed to consider two di6erent cases.
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(viii) If (u; ) is maximal in ][ then u is rec-normal for :
(ix) If  is contingent, then  i?  belongs to all theories that are rec-normal
for :
(x)  i? Ec .
Proof. (i) Since u is rec-normal for , there exists a normal world k for  such that
u= k∩B. We consider two cases.
First, suppose that  =∈k: Since k is normal for ; 6 and  =∈k, by (iii) from
Lemma 2.2, k is normal for . So, u (i.e., k∩B) is rec-normal for .
Second, suppose that ∈k. From  =∈k∩B and ∈k, we get  =∈B. So, by Inclusion
and Vacuity, we have T=B. Therefore, B is the only rec-normal theory for . In
the following, we will show u=B. Since 6 and 6, we obtain 6∧6.
Thus, ∧∧→  and ∧→ ∧, and hence ∧↔∧. Consequently,
by (i) from Lemma 2.1, T= ∧. Since B is deductively closed and  =∈B, we
get ∧ =∈B. Hence, by Inclusion and Vacuity, we have T= ∧=B. Immediately,
u=B follows from T⊆k and u= k∩B, as desired.
(ii) By (ii) from Lemma 2.1, from 6 and 6; we get → . Since u is a
rec-normal theory for , by Inclusion, we obtain T⊆u. Furthermore, ∈u follows from
∈u and u is deductively closed.
(iii) Immediately follows from the de:nition of ≺c, the transitivity of 6 and (ii)
from this lemma.
(iv) Assume that (u; ) is maximal in ][, but 6 does not hold. Thus, there exists
a world k including both ∧ and ∧¬. So, by (ii) from Lemma 2.2, k is normal for
∧. Hence, k∩B is rec-normal for ∧. By ∧¬∈k and ∈B, we get ∈k∩B.
Hence, (u; )≺c (k∩B, ∧), which contradicts the maximality of (u; ) in ][.
(v) Assume that  =∈u; 6 and (u; ) is not maximal in ][. So, there exists a state
(v; ) such that (u; )≺c (v; ) and  =∈v. Consequently, ∈v and 6. Furthermore, by
(ii) from this lemma, we get ∈v; which contradicts  =∈v.
(vi) Assume that  =∈B, u is a rec-normal theory for  and (u; ) is not a pre-
ferred state in the canonical rec-epistemic state. So, there exists a state (v; ) such that
(u; )≺c (v; ). Hence, ∈v. Since v is rec-normal for , we get v⊆B, and hence
∈B, a contradiction.
(vii) Suppose that (u; )∈][ and (u; ) is not maximal in ][. So, by (vi) from this
lemma, we get ∈B. Furthermore, by (v) from this lemma, we know that 6 does
not hold. The construction in the proof of (iv) provides a state (k∩B; ∧) such
that (u; )≺c (k∩B; ∧) and  =∈k∩B. Moreover, by (v) from this lemma, (k∩B,
∧) is maximal in ][: Hence, the set ][ is smooth.
(viii) We consider two cases. First, suppose that ∈B. By (i) and (iv) from this
lemma, we know that u is rec-normal for : Second, suppose that  =∈B. So, by
Inclusion and Vacuity, we get u=B. Further, since (u; ) is maximal in ][, we get
 =∈B: Hence, due to the deductive closure of B, there exists a world k including both
¬ and B. Obviously, k is normal for  and B⊆k. Consequently, u (i.e., k∩B) is
rec-normal for :
(ix) The implication from left to right follows immediately from Inclusion and (ii)
from Lemma 2.2. In the following, we deal with the other direction. Suppose that
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 belongs to all theories that are rec-normal for . So, by the de:nition of a rec-
normal theory, we get ∈B. Further, by Recovery, we obtain → . We want
to show that . Assume that   . Since →  and   , by And and Right
Weakening, we have   ∨ . Hence, the set T∪{¬;¬} is consistent. So, there is
a world k including T∪{¬;¬}. Clearly, k∩B is rec-normal for  and  =∈k∩B, a
contradiction.
(x) If  satis:es ff,  =Ec holds trivially. 8 In the following, we suppose
that  satis:es f f. So, f is contingent. Further, since the case when  is not
contingent can be reduced to showing that f i6 fEc , 9 we may suppose that 
is contingent. By (v) and (viii) from this lemma, the set lc(max(][)) coincides with
the set of theories that are rec-normal for . So, by (ix) from this lemma, we get
{ : }= { : Ec }.
3. Image structures
This paper aims to establish a representation theorem for recovering contraction re-
lations satisfying the postulate wci in terms of so-called F-standard epistemic AGM
states introduced in the next section, thus, how to get a desired epistemic state for
a given contraction relation is crucial. This section will introduce a notion of an im-
age structure associated with the canonical epistemic state, a similar structure for the
preferential model has appeared in [19,18]. As the technique in [19], in this paper, an
image structure is regarded as a transforming of the epistemic state through which a
desired epistemic state (i.e., F-standard epistemic AGM state) is obtained. This stand-
point di6ers from Bochman’s, he constructs a standard epistemic state directly based on
a given contraction relation when dealing with the representation theorem for rational
contractions (see [3]).
Denition 3.1. Let Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 be a canonical rec-epistemic state. The image
structure associated with Ec is a triple 〈B∗; id;≺∗〉, where
(i) B∗= rang(lc);
(ii) id is the identity function over B∗; and
(iii) ≺∗ is a binary relation over the set B∗ such that for any u; v∈B∗,
u ≺∗ v if and only if ∀( ∈ "recu ⇒ ∃( ∈ "recv and (u; ) ≺c (v; ))):
In the following, the image structure associated with Ec will be denoted by $(Ec).
For any formula , ][$(Ec) =def{u : u∈B∗ such that  =∈u } and max(][$(Ec))=def
{u : u∈][$(Ec) and there is no v∈][$(Ec) such that u≺∗ v}:
The following two lemmas are trivial, but useful.
8 See footnote 6.
9 See the proof of Lemma 4.10 in [3].
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Lemma 3.1. If $(Ec)= 〈B∗; id;≺∗〉 is the image structure induced by the canonical
rec-epistemic state Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉, then ≺∗ is a strict partial order.
Proof. By the transitivity of ≺c, it is obvious that ≺∗ is transitive. In the following, we
will show that ≺∗ is irreOexive. Suppose that there is a theory u∈B∗ such that u ≺∗ u.
Since u∈B∗, by the de:nition of canonical rec-epistemic state, there exists a contingent
proposition  such that ∈" recu and (u; )∈Bc. Hence, by (v) from Lemma 2.3, (u; )
is maximal in ][Ec . On the other hand, by u≺∗ u, there exists ∈" recv such that
(u; )≺c (u; ). Since ≺c is irreOexive and (u; )∈][Ec ; (u; ) is not maximal in ][Ec ,
a contradiction. Thus, the relation ≺∗ is irreOexive, as desired.
Lemma 3.2. If $(Ec)= 〈B∗; id;≺∗〉 is the image structure induced by the canonical
rec-epistemic state Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉, then lc(max(][Ec ))⊆max(][$(Ec)).
Proof. Suppose that u∈lc(max(][Ec )). So, there exists a contingent proposition 
such that (u; )∈Bc and (u; )∈max(][Ec ). In the following, we will show u∈max
(][$(Ec)): Suppose not. Then, there is a theory v∈B∗ such that u≺∗ v and v∈][$(Ec):
Thus, there exists a contingent proposition  such that (u; )≺c (v; ). Furthermore, by
(v; )∈][Ec , we get (u; ) =∈max(][Ec ), a contradiction. Hence, u∈max(][$(Ec)); as
desired.
Obviously, in order to de:ne the image structure induced by any canonical epis-
temic state, we need only to adopt "u ("v) instead of " recu (respectively, "
rec
v ) in
De:nition 3.1. Moreover, the above two lemmas also trivially hold for these image
structures.
4. Representation theorem for recovering contraction relations satisfying WCI
In this section, based on the image structure, we will establish a representation
theorem for recovering contraction relations satisfying the condition wci in terms of
F-standard epistemic AGM states. The proof of the representation theorem given in
this section will follow the general pattern of the proof given for preferential relations
in [19]. However, the de:nitions involved in this paper are quite di6erent from the
ones in [19], and this will bring some drastic changes in the proof.
Denition 4.1. A recovering contraction relation  will be called wci-recovering con-
traction relation if it satis:es the following condition wci:
 ∧  ⊆ Cn( T ∪ T); where  and  are contingent propositions:
Moreover, a contraction relation  will be said to be consistent, if f f holds;
otherwise, it will be said to be inconsistent.
Firstly, we deal with the limited case in which the contraction relation  is assumed
to be inconsistent.
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Observation 4.1. A contraction relation  is inconsistent if and only if  =E , where
E= 〈{Form(L)}; id; ∅〉.
Proof. The implication from the right to the left follows immediately from De:nition
2.5. In the following, we deal with the other direction. Suppose that  is inconsistent.
For any proposition  and , by Right Weakening and Extensionality, ∧f∧f
follows from ff. Further, by Cautious Monotony, we have . So, by De:ni-
tion 2.5,  =E holds.
In the rest of this section, we concern ourselves with consistent recovering contraction
relations, however, we do not assume that contraction relations are consistent, and the
following results, except for the ones indicated explicitly, also hold for inconsistent
relations trivially.
Denition 4.2. Given a contraction relation  , for any deductively closed theory u, u
will be called rec-normal closed under conjunction if, for any contingent propositions
 and , {; }⊆" recu implies ∧∈" recu :
Lemma 4.1. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Then, for any deductively closed theory v∈rang
(lc), v is rec-normal closed under conjunction.
Proof. Suppose that v is rec-normal for the contingent proposition i, i=1; 2: We will
show that v is rec-normal for 1∧2: Since v is rec-normal for i (i=1; 2), there exist
worlds u1 and u2 such that ui is normal for i (i=1; 2) and v= u1∩B= u2∩B.
Applying Inclusion, we get 1⊆v and 2⊆v, and hence 1∧2⊆u1 follows from
1∧2⊆Cn(1∪2). By 1 =∈u1; we get 1∧2 =∈u1: Consequently, by (ii) from
Lemma 2.2, u1 is normal for 1∧2. So, the theory v (i.e., u1∩B) is rec-normal
for 1∧2, as desired.
Lemma 4.2. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Suppose that the theory v∈rang(lc). Then, for
any contingent proposition  such that  =∈v and  =∈" recv , the set
⋃ {∧ : ∈" recv }
∪ {¬}∪" recv is consistent.
Proof. Suppose that the set
⋃ {∧ : ∈" recv }∪{¬}∪" recv is inconsistent. Hence, by
the compactness, there exist 1; 2; : : : ; n; n+1; : : : ; m∈" recv such that ∧1∪∧2
∪ · · · ∪∧n  n+1∧ · · · ∧m→ . In the following, we denote 1∧2∧ · · · ∧n ∧
n+1∧ · · · ∧m by %. By Lemma 4.1, v is rec-normal for %. Thus, we obtain (v; %)∈Bc.
Since  =∈v, we get (v; %)∈][Ec . By  =∈" recv and (viii) from Lemma 2.3, we have
(v; %) =∈max(][Ec ). Further, by (vii) from Lemma 2.3, there exists a theory u and a
contingent proposition  such that (v; %)≺c (u; ) and (u; )∈max(][Ec ). So, 6% and
%∈u. We consider two cases as follows.
First, suppose that ∈B: Thus, by (iv) from Lemma 2.3, 6 holds. Further-
more, by 6% and (i) from Lemma 2.2, we get 6∧%. For any i (16i6m),
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from 6∧%6∧i and ∧i =∈u, by (i) from Lemma 2.3, we obtain ∧i∈" recu .
So, ∧1∪∧2∪ · · · ∪∧n⊆u. Further, since u is deductively closed, ∈u imme-
diately follows from %∈u and ∧1∪∧2∪ · · · ∪∧n  n+1∧ · · · ∧m→ , which
contradicts (u; )∈max(][Ec ).
Second, suppose that  =∈B. Hence, by Inclusion and Vacuity, we obtain u=B. So,
by Inclusion, ∧1∪∧2∪ · · · ∪∧n⊆u holds. Analogously, we have ∈u, which
contradicts (u; )∈max(][Ec ).
Consequently, the set
⋃ {∧ : ∈" recv }∪{¬}∪{ : ∈" recv } is consistent.
Lemma 4.3. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Suppose that v∈rang(lc) and there exists a
contingent proposition  such that  =∈v and  =∈" recv , then " recv ⊆B.
Proof. Since v is not rec-normal for ; by (viii) from Lemma 2.3, (v; ) =∈max(][)
for any ∈" recv . Thus, for any ∈" recv , by the smoothness of ≺c and (v; )∈][, there
exists (u; &)∈Bc such that (v; )≺c (u; &). So, by the de:nition of the canonical
epistemic state, we get ∈u, further, ∈B immediately follows from u⊆B. Thus,
" recv ⊆B, as desired.
Lemma 4.4. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Suppose that the theory v∈rang(lc). Then, for
any contingent proposition  such that  =∈v and  =∈" recv , there exists a theory u0∈
rang(lc) such that v≺∗ u0 and u0 is rec-normal for .
Proof. Suppose that  is a contingent proposition such that  =∈v and v is not rec-
normal for . By Lemma 4.2, the set
⋃ {∧ : ∈" recv }∪{¬}∪" recv is consistent.
Thus, there exists a world k including this set. Obviously, for any ∈" recv , by (ii) and
(iii) from Lemma 2.2, k is normal for both  and ∧, further, k∩B is rec-normal for
them. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.3, " recv ⊆B. Consequently, " recv ⊆k∩B. So,
for any ∈" recv , we have (v; )≺c (k∩B; ∧). Hence, v≺∗ k∩B holds, as desired.
Lemma 4.5. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Then, the relation ≺∗ is smooth.
Proof. Suppose that  is contingent, and u is a theory such that u∈][$(Ec) and
u =∈max(][$(Ec)). Since u∈][$(Ec) and u =∈max(][$(Ec)), by Lemma 3.2 and (v) from
Lemma 2.3, the theory u is not rec-normal for . Hence, by Lemma 4.4, there exists
a theory v such that u≺∗ v and v is rec-normal for . Moreover, by Lemma 3.2 and
(v) from Lemma 2.3, v∈max(][$(Ec)) holds.
Lemma 4.6. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉 the
canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Then, lc(max(][))=max(][$(Ec)) for any con-
tingent proposition :
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Proof. By Lemma 3.2, it is enough to show that lc(max(][))⊇max(][$(Ec)). Sup-
pose that u∈max(][$(Ec)). By Lemma 4.4, u is rec-normal for . So, by (v) from
Lemma 2.3, the state (u; ) is maximal in ][Ec . Hence, u∈lc(max(][Ec )), as desired.
As observed in [3], given a (consistent) recovering contraction, the canonical epis-
temic AGM state for it is just ‘almost’ coherent in that all its preferred states are
labeled by B, and we will get a desired epistemic AGM state by identifying all these
states. However, for any wci-recovering contraction relation such that f f, the im-
age structure induced by its canonical rec-epistemic AGM state is a genuine epistemic
AGM state. Formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. Let  be a consistent wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc;
lc;≺c〉 the canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Then, $(Ec)= 〈B∗; id;≺∗〉 is a stan-
dard epistemic AGM state.
Proof. First, we show B∈B∗. Since f f, there exists a contingent proposition 
such that  =∈B. By Inclusion and Vacuity, we get T=B, further, B is rec-normal
for . Hence, B∈B∗, as desired.
Second, we show that B is the most preferred admissible belief state in $(Ec)
and includes all other admissible states. Suppose that u is a state from $(Ec) such that
u =B. So, u⊂B immediately follows from the de:nition of the rec-normal theory. In
the following, we will show u≺∗B. For any ∈" recu , since u is rec-normal for  and
u⊂B, by Vacuity, we get ∈B. Since f f, there exists a contingent proposition 
such that  =∈B. By the deductive closure of B, ∧ =∈B holds. So, by Inclusion and
Vacuity, B is rec-normal for ∧. Obviously, (u; )≺c (B; ∧). Since  is taken to
be an arbitrary proposition from " recu , by the de:nition of the relation ≺∗, we obtain
u≺∗B, as desired. Further, by Lemmas 3.1 and 4.5, $(Ec) is a coherent epistemic
state.
Finally, we show that, for any v∈B∗, v is B itself or a maximal deductively closed
subset of B. Suppose that v∈B∗ and v =B. By the de:nition of rec-normal theory,
we know that v is a subtheory of B. In the following, we will show that v is a
maximal proper subtheory of B. Suppose that there exists a deductively closed theory
u such that v⊂u⊂B: Since v∈B∗, there exists a contingent proposition  such that
∈" recv . By the de:nition of the rec-normal theory, there exists a world k such that
v= k∩B and k is normal for . From v⊂u⊂B and Recovery, we get  =∈u. Since
v⊂u, there is a proposition  such that ∈u−v. Since ∈B and  =∈v, we get ¬∈k.
So, → ∈k. From v⊂B and ∈" recv , by Vacuity, ∈B holds. So, → ∈B.
Thus, → ∈k∩B= v. Further, by v⊂u, we obtain → ∈u. So, a contradiction
immediately follows from  =∈u, → ∈u, ∈u and u is deductively closed.
Consequently, $(Ec) is a standard epistemic AGM state.
For any inconsistent wci-recovering contraction relation  , since Bc =B∗= ∅, 10 the
above lemma does not hold.
10 See footnote 6.
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As a consequence of the above lemmas, we immediately obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation and Ec = 〈Bc; lc;≺c〉
the canonical rec-epistemic state for  . Then, Ec =$(Ec):
Proof. If  is inconsistent, then, Ec =$(Ec) immediately follows from Ec =$(Ec)
= 〈∅; ∅; ∅〉: In the following, we suppose that  is consistent.
By De:nition 3.1, we get rang(lc)=B∗, so, for any formula ,  is contingent with
respect to Ec if and only if it is contingent with respect to $(Ec): If  is contingent,
then, by Lemma 4.6, we have, Ec  i6 $(Ec), for any . Now, suppose that
 is known. By the proof of Lemma 4.7, B is the only most preferred admissible
belief state in both $(Ec) and Ec, so, Ec  i6 $(Ec), for any . Consequently,
Ec =$(Ec) holds, as desired.
For any consistent wci-recovering contraction relation  , by (x) from Lemma 2.3,
we know that the canonical rec-epistemic state Ec for  satis:es  =Ec , furthermore,
by Corollary 4.1 and Lemma 4.7, $(Ec) is a standard epistemic AGM state such that
 =$(Ec). On the other hand, if  is inconsistent, by Observation 4.1, we have
 =E; where E= 〈{Form(L)}; id; ∅〉 is a standard epistemic AGM state trivially. In
conclusion, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation, then there exists a
standard epistemic AGM state E such that  =E .
In order to establish the representation theorem for wci-recovering contraction rela-
tion in the in:nite framework, we introduce a notion of an F-standard epistemic AGM
state as follows, which is similar to the standard model introduced in [2].
Denition 4.3. A standard epistemic AGM state E= 〈B;≺〉 will be said to be
F-standard if it satis:es the following condition:
For any contingent proposition  and deductively closed theory u, u∈max(][) if
and only if u is rec-normal for  with respect to E .
Corollary 4.2. Let  be a wci-recovering contraction relation, then there exists an
F-standard epistemic AGM state E such that  =E:
Proof. We consider two cases as follows.
First, suppose that  is consistent. Let Ec be the canonical rec-epistemic state in-
duced by  . By Lemma 4.7, we know that the image structure $(Ec) is a standard
epistemic AGM state. Further, according to the construction of canonical rec-epistemic
state, (v) and (viii) from Lemmas 2.3 and 4.6, $(Ec) is F-standard, moreover, by
Corollary 4.1 and (x) from Lemma 2.3, we have  =$(Ec).
Second, suppose that  is inconsistent. Obviously, E= 〈{Form(L)}; id; ∅〉 is
F-standard trivially, further, by Observation 4.1,  =E holds.
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It is worth pointing out that, when the language is :nite, F-standard epistemic
AGM states coincide with standard ones, formally, we have the following observation.
A similar observation for the preferential model is due to Lehmann [16, p. 236].
Observation 4.2. In the :nite framework, E= 〈B;≺〉 is a standard epistemic AGM
state if and only if it is F-standard.
Proof. The implication from the right to the left follows immediately from De:nition
4.3. In the following, we deal with the other direction.
First, suppose that u∈max(][). So, by the de:nition of the epistemic AGM state,
u⊆BE holds. In the following, we will show that, u is rec-normal for  with respect
to E . From u∈max(][), we get  =∈u and T⊆u, where T= { : E }. Since E is
an epistemic AGM state, the relation E satis:es Inclusion and Vacuity (see [3]). We
consider two cases.
Case 1, suppose that  =∈BE . By Inclusion and Vacuity, we get T=BE , further,
u=BE follows from u⊆BE and T⊆u. Since u is a consistent theory such that  =∈u,
there exists a world k including u∪{¬}. Clearly, k is a normal world for  such that
u= k∩BE .
Case 2, suppose that ∈BE . So, u =BE follows from ∈BE − u. In the following,
we will show that the set u∪{¬ : ∈BE − u} is consistent. Otherwise, there are
1; 2; : : : ; n∈BE−u such that %∈u, where %= 1 ∨ 2 ∨ · · · ∨n. By the de:nition of
the epistemic AGM state and u =BE , u is a maximal proper subtheory of BE , so, we
have i→ ∈u for any i (16i6n), 11 further, %→ ∈u. Hence, we get ∈u, which
contradicts u∈max(][). Consequently, the set u∪{¬ : ∈BE − u} is consistent, and
there exists a world k including it. Obviously, by (ii) from Lemma 2.2, k is normal
for , and u= k∩BE follows from k⊇u∪{¬ : ∈BE − u} and u⊆BE .
Together case 1 with case 2, we know that, u is rec-normal for  with respect to E .
Second, suppose that u is rec-normal for  with respect to E . In the following, we
want to show u∈max(][). Suppose not. Since E is an epistemic AGM state, BE is
the most preferred admissible belief state in E. So, u =BE , and u is a maximal proper
subtheory of BE . 12 By Vacuity and T⊆u ⊂ BE , ∈BE holds. From the :rst part of
this proof and the :niteness of the language, by the de:nition of the rec-normal theory,
the set max(][) is :nite. So, we may suppose that max(][)= {v1; v2; : : : ; vn}. Hence,
for any vi (16i6n), vi is a maximal proper subtheory of BE such that vi =u. Further,
by the maximality of vi and u⊆BE , there exists i such that i∈vi−u for any 16i6n.
Consequently, %∈ T, where %= 1 ∨ 2 ∨ · · · ∨n. Since u is rec-normal for , we get
%∈u. On the other hand, for any i (16i6n), we have i→ ∈u, 13 so, %→ ∈u.
Thus, ∈u follows from %→ ∈u and %∈u, which contradicts the assumption that u
is rec-normal for .
11 Otherwise, suppose that  =∈Cn(u∪{i}). So, Cn(u∪{i}) is a proper subtheory of BE , and includes u
properly, which contradicts the fact that u is a maximal subtheory of BE .
12 See the proof of Lemma 4.7 in this paper.
13 See footnote 11.
Z. Zhu et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 545–564 561
Lemma 4.8. If a contraction relation  is represented by an F-standard epistemic
AGM state E= 〈B;≺〉, then  is a wci-recovering contraction relation.
Proof. Since the contraction relation determined by an epistemic AGM state is a re-
covering contraction (see [3]), it is enough to show that E (i.e., ) satis:es the
condition wci. Let  and  be two contingent propositions. Suppose that ∈∧.
We want to show ∈Cn(T∪ T). Assume that  =∈Cn(T∪ T). Since ∈∧, by Inclu-
sion, we get f. By Recovery, →  and →  hold. By Tautology, we have
→ . Further, since  =∈Cn(T∪ T) and {→ ; → ; → }⊆Cn(T∪ T); we obtain
∨ ∨  =∈Cn(T∪ T). Hence, the set T∪ T∪{¬ (∨ ∨ )} is consistent. So, there exists
a world k including T∪ T∪{¬ (∨ ∨ )}. Obviously, by (ii) from Lemma 2.2, k∩B
is rec-normal for both  and . By the de:nition of the F-standard epistemic AGM
state, k∩B∈max(][)∩max(][). Since max(][)∩max(][)⊆max(]∧[),
we get k∩B∈max(]∧[). A contradiction immediately follows from ∈∧ and
 =∈k∩B. Consequently, ∈Cn(T∪ T) holds, as desired.
Theorem 4.2 (Representation theorem).  is a wci-recovering contraction relation if
and only if  is represented by an F-standard epistemic AGM state.
Proof. It immediately follows from Lemma 4.8 and Corollary 4.2.
REMARK We have heard one comment about the above theorem that, since the
notion of the F-standard epistemic state is de:ned in terms of the generated contrac-
tion relation, this notion is de:ned essentially with respect to the source contraction
relation, so, the above theorem is circular and is not fully satisfactory. We tend to dis-
agree with this comment. We think that, De:nition 4.3 provides a nontrivial suUcient
condition which guarantees the generated relation to be a wci-recovering relation (see
Lemma 4.8). In fact, this de:nition only refers to the generated contraction relation but
not the condition wci. Moreover, if someone does not tolerate that the notion of the
F-standard epistemic state is de:ned in terms of the generated relation, we can rede:ne
this notion equivalently as follows:
A standard epistemic AGM state E= 〈B;≺〉 will be said to be F-standard if, for
any contingent proposition  and deductively closed theory u, u∈max(][) if and only
if there exists a world v satisfying the following conditions:
(i) ¬∈v,




Clearly, according to De:nition 2.7 and (ii) from Lemma 2.2, the above de:nition
coincides with De:nition 4.3, and does not refer to the generated contraction relation
at all. So, we do not think that Theorem 4.2 is circular. However, since the notion of
an F-standard state is de:ned in the slightly unusual manner as compared with ones in
the literature, a representation result for wci-recovering relations in terms of a species
of epistemic states, which is depicted in a nice manner, will improve the above result
remarkably.
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Together the above theorem with Observation 4.2, the following corollary is obtained
trivially. A similar result in the AGM tradition is due to Rott (see [16]).
Corollary 4.3. In the @nite framework,  is a wci-recovering contraction relation if
and only if  is represented by a standard epistemic AGM state.
5. Discussion
This paper establishes a representation theorem for recovering contraction relations
satisfying weak conjunctive inclusion in terms of F-standard epistemic AGM states,
in e6ect, this theorem generalizes a result obtained by Rott in the :nite framework.
Recently, Bochman explores the semantic character for a more wider category of con-
traction relations (i.e., so-called recovering contraction relations), and obtains a rep-
resentation theorem for them based on the notion of the epistemic AGM state. As
observed by Rott, the di6erence between epistemic AGM states and standard ones is
essential, even in the :nite framework, there exist contraction relations generated by
epistemic AGM states, which are not representable by standard ones (see [3]). Theorem
4.1 in this paper indicates that, the condition wci is suUcient for recovering contraction
relations to be represented by standard epistemic AGM states. Rott also obtains a sim-
ilar result in the AGM tradition with the distinct technical strategy in [16]. Moreover,
the result due to Rott in [12] 14 and Corollary 4.3 in this paper demonstrate that, in
the :nite case, the condition wci is also necessary for a standard representation in both
the AGM tradition and Bochman’s framework, respectively. However, in the in:nite
case, since the di6erence between standard epistemic AGM states and F-standard ones
seemed to be essential, Theorem 4.2 in this paper suggests that, wci is not necessary
for recovering contraction relations to be represented by standard ones. In other words,
it seems that the condition wci is not valid in standard epistemic AGM states in the
in:nite framework. Incidentally, results in [16] and this paper indicate that, the con-
dition wci is valid in both standard epistemic AGM states in the :nite language and
any F-standard ones, but is not valid in epistemic AGM states even in the :nite case.
Anyway, for the moment, it seems to be a diUcult task to exactly characterize
contraction relations which admit a representation in terms of standard epistemic AGM
states. The similar diUculty also appears in the nonmonotonic logic, for instance, Pino
PWerez and UzcWategui write in [15]:
“There two families of consequence relation seem so complex that we will not
be surprised if there is no such a characterization (at least in terms of the type
of postulates used so far to classify consequence relations)”.
In the above quote, two families point at preferential relations which are rep-
resentable by injective preferential models and standard preferential models introduced
by Freund in [7], respectively. In the :nite framework, Freund provides a
14 See Corollary 2 in [16].
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representation theorem for preferential relations satisfying the condition WDR 15 in
terms of injective preferential models (see [7]), which corresponds to the result due to
Rott in [16] and Corollary 4.3 in this paper.
Inspired by Freund’s work, in [19], we introduce a notion of a valuation structure
which consists of worlds ordered by a binary relation de:ned in [18], and present a
canonical approach to obtain an injective preferential model for any preferential relation
satisfying the property WDR. Furthermore, we give uniform proofs of representation
theorems for injective preferential relations appeared in the literature, in particular, we
provide the semantic character for preferential inference relations satisfying WDR (see,
Theorem 4.3 in [17]). This result may be regarded as a counterpart of Theorem 4.2 in
this paper for nonmonotonic logics, in e6ect, which establishes the semantic character
for recovering contraction relations satisfying both ¬ and wci. However, due to
manifest di6erences between the de:nitions involved in [19] and the ones in this paper,
the proofs in this paper are rather di6erent from [19].
Recently, Pino PWerez and UzcWategui also give a uniform and simple framework to
prove the hard part of representation theorems for injective preferential relations based
on essential pre-structure (see [15]). From the present results, strictly speaking, their
method provides a uniform approach to construct injective preferential models only for
any preferential relations satisfying Disjunctive Rationality 16 (see [19]). They show
that, if a preferential inference relation satis:es WDR, then it may be generated by the
essential pre-structure associated with it. Unfortunately, in the in:nite framework, so
far it is unknown whether this structure is an injective preferential model when a given
inference relation satis:es WDR but not Disjunctive Rationality. 17 ;18 In addition, Pino
PWerez and UzcWategui provide an example which reveals that, in the in:nite language, the
condition WDR is not necessary for a representation in terms of injective preferential
models. In a sense, this result also supports the conjecture that, in the in:nite case, the
postulate wci is not necessary for recovering contraction relations to be represented by
standard epistemic AGM states.
A more detailed comparison about the work in [7,19] and [15] may be found in
[19].
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